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ABSTRACT 
From June 1997 till presently had been a period of economic turmoil for many 
parts of the A sian region . There has been experiences of economic overheating 
, inflation , deficit balance of payments , rising interest rates coupled with the 
downward spiral of the stock markets and currency devaluations . 
This has brought about numerous debates on the cause s  and remedies of this 
crisi s. Among them are the usefulness of the currency board regime in regulating 
the exchange rates of the countries involved. This is  an alternative system to the 
present regime of central banks in managing the countries' money supply. 
The currency board basically i s  a monetary regime whereby the exchange rate of 
the country as  fixed with a chosen anchor currency whereby all its money supply 
must be 100% backed by its foreign reserves. 
The central bank system employs the floating exchange rate which has been 
unsuccessful in warding off speculations on the currency. Further many other 
disadvantages will be discussed in this thesis. 
This thesis  discuss the comparative characteristics between the currency board 
and the central bank monetary regime in all its advantages and disadvantages . 
An attempt i s  made to define the currency board and the central bank and the 
many versions associated with them. (Le., classical , modern and AEL-Argentina, 
Lithuania , Estonia -model) 
A closely related concept to the currency board , namely dollarization is also 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
There has been numerous debates regarding the benefits and costs of a currency 
board versus a central bank in managing the recent currency crisis that has 
enveloped the Asian countries. 
Prior to this crisis , the term 'currency board ' was not heard of but now is frequently 
mentioned in the mass-media. Besides currency board , another term that is 
dollarization will also be discussed briefly in this thesis. 
1.1 ) THE ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS 
On July 2, 1997 Thailand devalued its currency against the U.S. dollar, triggering a 
Southeast Asian currency crisis that has led to devaluation's in Indonesia, Malaysia , 
Singapore, the Philippines , Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
On 1 July 1997, just before Thailand devalued the baht, the exchange rate of the 
Indonesian rupiah was 2,431 per dollar. Then, in January 1998, the exchange rate is 
more than 12,000 per dollar, and it recently touched 17,000 per dollar. 
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Under the cur rent floating exchange rate, nothing prevents the rupiah from falling to 
15 ,000 or  20,000 per dollar as the loss of confidence in the rupiah becomes outright 
panic. Cent ral banking system has wo rked poo rly in Indonesia to mitigate its currency 
crisis. 
Among the cu rrencies that have suffered speculative attacks in the East Asian 
currency crisis but has not devalued very much a re the Hong Kong dollar and 
Singapore dollar. 
The Hong Kong dollar came unde r speculative attack against the U.S. dollar during 
the week of October 20-24. The attack peaked on October 23. Overnight interest 
rates in the inter-bank market rose as high as 300 percent a year in response to a 
deliberate tightening by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (their currency board) to 
discourage speculation against the Hong Kong dollar . Hong Kong 's stock market 
plunged 10 .4 percent, to its lowest price-to earnings ratio . The following day, 
overnight interest rates in Hong Kong fell to 7-8 percent a year, again in response to 
deliberate action by the HKMA. 
Schuler (Feb 1998) suggests that Indonesia should imitate Hong Kong and establish 
a currency board . Simply announcing that Indonesia intended to establish a currency 
board in the near future would probably make the rupiah appreciate considerably 
from its current, incredibly cheap level. A more valuable rupiah would also enable at 
least some Indonesian companies to avoid defaulting on their foreign debt . 
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What anchor currency should Indonesia choose ? The most likely choice is the U.S. 
dollar. The dollar is the most widely used and widely known foreign currency in 
Indonesia. It was the anchor currency for the target zone that Bank Indonesia 
unsuccessfully tried to maintain when the currency crisis began. And the dollar has a 
high likelihood of continuing to have low inflation. A less likely choice for an anchor 
currency is the Japanese yen. The yen, though a major international currency, is not 
as widely used as the dollar. 
The currency crisis has been attributed to large cashing out of foreign funds in the 
country. The manager of the portfolio manager quickly cash out their investment and 
converted the Ringgit to U S  Dollar. This lead to the devaluation of the Ringgit. The 
efforts made by the government to stall the devaluation through the use of 
international reserve and increasing interest rates has not been completely 
successful and the Ringgit value has depreciated by more than 40% since July 
1997. 
CHAPTER 2 
DEFINITION OF CURRENCY BOARD 
& THE CENTRAL BANK 
2.1 ) What is a Currency Board? 
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Sir Alan Walters, the architect of Hong Kong's currency board defined a 
"Currency Board" as follows: 
" The main characteristic of the currency board system is that the board stands 
ready to exchange domestic currency for the foreign reserve currency at a 
specific and fixed rate. To perform this function the board is required to hold 
realizable financial assets in the reserve currency at least equal to the value of 
the domestic currency outstanding. Hence in the currency board system there 
can be no fiduciary issue. The backing of the currency must be at least 100%. " 
Based on the above , a currency board can be defined as an organization that issues 
notes, coins, and deposits fully backed by a foreign " anchor " currency, and fully 
convertible into the anchor currency at a fixed rate and on demand. The anchor 
currency is a convertible foreign currency chosen for its stability. Further, the country 
that issues the anchor currency is called the anchor country. 
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As reserves, a currency board holds low-risk bonds and other assets payable in the 
anchor currency. A currency board holds reserves equal to 100 percent of slightly 
more of the monetary base, as set by law. A currency board earns profit f rom the 
difference between the interest it earns from its anchor-currency assets and the 
expense of maintaining its notes and coins. A currency board does not have 
discretionary control of the quantity of notes, coins, and deposits it supplies. Market 
forces determine both the monetary base and broader measures of the supply of 
money that include bank deposits and other forms of credit. 
The currency board system comprises the currency board, commercial banks, and 
other financial institutions. 
Another characteristic of all genuine currency boards is that they should be prohibited 
from buying or holding domestic treasury or commercial securities. Since a currency 
board is constrained to issue currency only in exchange for " realizable financial 
assets" that are freely conve rtible into the reserve currency, it is powerless to create 
domestic money by extending credit as conventional central banks can do. That 
means that a currency board ( unlike a central bank ) cannot function as " lender of 
last resort" eithe r to the state t reasu ry o r  to comme rcia l banks. 
Strict limits on a currency board's power to issue money constrain its operation in two 
important respects : 
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a) the board cannot finance ( i.e., monetize ) the government's budgetary deficits, 
and 
b) it cannot regulate the nation's money supply by engaging in open market 
operations or discounting domestic bank-held paper. 
It is these two constrains that attract the most determined opposition to the currency 
board idea, and at the same time, inspire its greatest admiration. 
Dr.Tsang Shu-ki from the Department of Economics , Hong Kong University , has 
also further attempts to define the currency board under 3 different identities , i.e., the 
classical currency board , modern version currency board and the A EL (Argentina , 
Estonia and Lithuania) model . These differing versions were attempts by the 
respective economies to adapt and change accordingly to their capability and current 
environment. These versions are discussed below. 
a) The Classical model issues notes and coins with 100% foreign reserves backing 
at a fixed exchange rate . This exchange rate is supposedly anchored at the same 
level because of 2 processes , the specie-flow mechanism (similar to the gold 
standard) whereby outflows of capital would contract the money supply , push up 
interest rates and induce a counter-flow automatically within a small time frame 
and without government intervention. 
b) Under the modern model , Dr.Tsang argues that in a open financial economy, this 
presumed balance of payments is far from perfect in the presence of expectations 
and uncertainty . He argues that higher interest rates may not induce the 
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expected counter-flow of capital , if the exchange rate itself is in doubt. The higher 
interest rates may indicate and be interpreted as a sign of weaknesses . This was 
exhibited recently in the Asian currency crisis whereby all the prevailing 
governments attempted to prevent the spiraling interest rate decrease via 
increased interest rates but to no avail. 
c) The A EL model is a model adopted by Argentina, Estonia and Lithuania 
latecomers to the currency board camp. This model suggests that arbitrage will 
technically bind the exchange rate . This model suggests that since the foreign 
reserves cover at least 100% of the cash in circulation , any attack on the market 
exchange rate away from the official rate , should allow people to convert their 
bank deposits into cash , enter the currency board to exchange the cash into 
foreign currency at the stronger official rate and then sell the foreign currency in 
the market, fetching an arbitrage profit. This selling pressure will bring the market 
exchange rate back to the level of its official rate. 
2.2 ) A brief history and assessment of currency boards 
More than 70 countries have had currency boards. The first currency board was 
established in 18 49 in the British Indian Ocean colony of Mauritius. Currency boards 
spread slowly until about 1900, when a few other British colonies and Argentina, an 
independent country, established currency boards. After 1900, currency boards 
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became the monetary arrangement of choice for British colonies and for some 
independent developing countries. Currency boards reached their greatest extent in 
the 1950s, when much of Africa, the Caribbean, and South Asia had currency 
boards. Besides Hong Kong, other countries near to Indonesia that have had 
currency boards are Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Burma. 
Figure 3. 1 summarise the selection of current existing countries with the currency 
board system and the anchor currency chosen. 
Figure 2. 1 - Selection of Existing Countries with Currency Board 
CountrylTerritory Date of Population as at Currency Peg 
Establish July 1994 
1) Argentina 199 1 33,9 12,994 U S  dollar 
2) Bermuda 19 15 6 1, 158 U S  dollar 
3) Brunei 1967 28 4,653 Singapore $ 
4) Cayman Islands 197 2 31 ,790 US dollar 
5) Estonia 1992 1,6 16,882 Deutsche mark 
6) Falkland Islands 1899 2,26 1 Pound sterling 
7) Faroe Islands 1940 48,427 Danish krone 
8) Gibraltar 1927 31,68 4 Pound sterling 
9) Hong Kong 198 3 5,548,754 US dollar 
10) Lithuania 1994 3,848,389 US dollar 
( Sources: Hanke , Jonung & Schuller , 1993 , C IA World Factbook 1994/95 , I M F  
publications) 
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Currency board systems have been successful in encouraging foreign investment. 
With currency boards, many countries have taken the decisive step from primitive 
monetary conditions to modern monetary systems that include sophisticated banking 
and foreign-exchange services. Inflation in currency board systems has been low. 
Economic growth has usually been satisfactory, and in some cases spectacular. 
Trade in export goods that have remained characteristic of certain countries 
originated during the years of the currency board system. Export of cocoa and 
peanuts in West Africa, rubber and tin in Malaysia, and textiles and financial services 
in Hong Kong all developed under currency boards. 
Currency board systems have typically been stable. All currency boards have 
successfully maintained fixed exchange rates and full convertibility into their anchor 
currencies, although in the 1970s some currency boards linked to the pound sterling 
changed to other more stable anchor currencies. Even during the Great Depression, 
all currency boards then existing maintained fixed exchange rates and full 
convertibility, unlike almost all central banks then existing. The oldest remaining 
currency board, in the Falkland Islands, has maintained a fixed exchange rate of 
Falklands 1 pound sterling per 1 pound British sterling since it opened in 1899. 
Despite the economic success of currency board systems, governments converted 
most currency boards into central banks in the late 1950s and the 1960s. Some 
governments were influenced by theoretical arguments that a central bank could 
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promote economic growth better than a currency board. Newly independent countries 
establ ished central banks because of the association of the currency board system 
with colonial rule, and because older, more established countries had central banks. 
A central bank was a symbol of independence, like a national flag. The actual 
performance of currency boards has been close to the ideal they have established to 
strive for, namely, to maintain full convertibility into the anchor currency at a fixed 
exchange rate according to strict rules of procedure. 
CHAPTER 3 
DEFINITION OF CENTRAL BANKS 
3.1 ) What is a Central Bank? 
A central bank is an organization that has discretionary monopoly control of the 
monetary base. 
" Discretionary control" is the ability to choose a monetary policy at will, at largely 
unconstrained by rules. The " monetary base " comprises notes and coins issued by 
the currency board or central banks, plus deposits held by commercial banks at the 
currency board or central bank. The monetary base counts as reserves when held by 
commercial banks, but not when held by the public. 
Deposits by the public at commercial banks and notes and coins held by the public or 
by commercial banks, constitute cash. 
Reserves mean the medium used to settle payments. ( In practice, near-monies such 
as accounts at money market mutual funds may be almost as liquid and widely 
accepted in payment a s  deposits at comme rcial banks.) 
Pervasive inflation and exchange rate instability cast grave doubts on the feasibility of 
active monetary policy as it is actually conducted in most countries. The record 
indicates that most central bank's attempts to manage the money supply or to 
manipulate interest rates cause more harm than good. That is because the conduct 
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of sound monetary policy demands independence from political pressures, 
transparent , valid and timely economic information, as well as considerable 
competence and courage that are rarely found within the world's central banks. Most 
developing nations, as well as industrial ones, would be better off if their monetary 
authorities had neither the power nor hubris to attempt it. 
3.2 ) A Scorecard for Central Banks 
Critics ask, can the state finance its budgetary deficits if the treasury cannot count on 
the monetary authority to buy its bonds and notes ? How can a monetary authority 
bound by such an iron rule of currency emissions have sufficient flexibility to " fine 
tune" the money supply or otherwise conduct an active monetary policy ? 
In fact, the depoliticization of monetary emissions is the currency board system's 
chief virtue. Currency boards make it difficult for governments to spend more than 
they can tax or borrow in free capital markets which actually provide a great service 
to a country. By impeding monetization of budgetary deficits, a currency board goes 
far to promote fiscal discipline that otherwise would be impossible to achieve. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A COMPARISON OF CENTRAL BANKS AND CURRENCY BOARDS 
Major benefits of the currency board system are : 
• making a nation's currency and exchange rate regimes more transparent, rule­
bound, and predictable; 
• placing an upper bound on the nation's base money supply, a bound that is 
determined by net capital inflows; 
• forcing the government to restrict its borrowings to what " arms-length" foreign 
and domestic lenders are willing to lend it at market interest rates; and 
• engendering confidence in the soundness of the nation's money in direct 
propo rtion to the length of time it is maintained in harmony with other supporting 
policies. 
Figure 4.1. Characteristics of A Currency Board versus A typical Central Bank 
Currency Board Typical Central Bank 
1 Fixed exchange rate with anchor Pegged or floating exchange rate 
currency 
2 Foreign reserves of 100 percent Variable foreign reserves 
3 Full convertibility 
4 Rule-bound monetary policy 
5 Not a lender of last resort 
6 Does not regulate commercial banks 
7 Transparent 
8 Protected from political pressure 
9 High credibility 
10 Earns seigniorage only from interest 
1 1  Cannot create inflation 
12 Cannot finance spending by 
domestic government 
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Limited convertibility 
Discretionary monetary policy 
Lender of last resort 
Often regulate commercial banks 
Opaque 
Politicized 
Low credibility 
Earns seigniorage from inflation 
Can create inflation 
Can finance spending by domestic 
government (As recently witnessed in 
Indonesia ) 
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13  Requires no " preconditions " for Requires" preconditions" for monetary 
monetary reform reform 
A currency board maintains a truly fixed exchange rate with the anchor currency. The 
exchange rate is permanent, or at most can be altered only in emergencies. The 
exchange rate may be written into the law governing the currency board. A typical 
central bank, in contrast, maintains a pegged or floating exchange rate rather than a 
truly fixed rate. A pegged exchange rate is constant for the time being in terms of an 
anchor currency, but carries no credible long-term guarantee of remaining at its 
current rate. A floating exchange rate is not maintained constant in terms of any 
anchor currency. The exchange rate maintained by a central bank is typically not 
written into law, and can be altered at the will of the central bank or the government . 
When a typical central bank suffers strong pressure to devalue the currency, it 
devalues, as Bank Indonesia did in 1997. 
As reserve assets against its liabilities ( its notes, coins, and deposits ) ,  a currency 
board holds anchor-currency bonds; it may also hold bank deposits and a small 
amount of notes in the reserve currency. It holds foreign reserves of 100 percent or 
slightly more of its note, coin, and deposit liabilities, as set by law. A typical central 
bank has variable foreign reserves : it is not required to maintain any fixed, binding 
ratio of foreign reserves to liabilities. A typical central bank also holds domestic­
currency assets, which a currency board does not. 
1 6  
A currency board has full convertibility of its currency : it exchanges its notes and 
coins for reserve currency at its stated fixed exchange rate without limit. Anybody 
who has anchor currency can exchange it for currency board notes and coins at the 
fixed rate, and anybody who has currency board notes and coins can exchange them 
for anchor currency at the fixed rate. A typical central bank has limited convertibility of 
its currency. 
A currency board has a rule-bound monetary policy. A currency board is not allowed 
to alter the exchange rate. Nor is a currency board allowed to alter its reserve ratio or 
the regulations affecting commercial banks. A currency board merely exchanges its 
notes and coins for anchor currency at a fixed rate in such quantities as commercial 
banks and the public demand. When the demand for money changes, the role of a 
currency board is passive. Market forces alone determine the money supply. A 
central bank can alter at will, or with the approval of the government, the exchange 
rate, its ratio of foreign reserves, or the regulations affecting commercial banks. It is 
not subject to strict rules like a currency board. 
A currency board is not a lender of last resort. Commercial banks in a currency board 
system must rely on alternatives to a lender of last resort. A typical central bank, in 
contrast, is a lender of last resort. 
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A currency board does not regulate commercial banks. I t  concentrates only on 
issuing the monetary base. A typical central bank, in contrast, often regulates 
commercial banks. 
The activities of a currency board are transparent, because a currency board is a 
very simple institution. A central bank is not a warehouse; it is a speculating 
institution whose effectiveness partly depends on the ability to act secretly . 
A currency board is protected from political pressure. It is protected by its own 
transparency, or, better yet, by any such law that the country should impose upon 
implementation . Some central banks are politically independent in the sense that 
their governors, once appointed, have sole control of the monetary base and cannot 
be fired by the government during their fixed terms of office. Even the most politically 
independent central banks sometimes yield to strong political pressure. 
A currency board has high credibility. Its 100 percent foreign reserves, rule-bound 
monetar y policy, transparency, and protection from political pressure enable it to 
maintain full convertibility and a fixed exchange rate with the anchor currency. A 
typical central bank has low credibility. Because a typical central bank has discretion 
in monetary policy, is opaque, and is politicized, it has the means and the incentive to 
break promises about the exchange rate or inflation whenever it wishes. 
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A currency board cannot finance spending by the domestic government or domestic 
state enterprises because it is not allowed to lend to them. 
A currency board is no guarantee against potentially destabilizing capital inflows 
which can bring monetary expansion, inflation, real appreciation of the domestic 
currency , reduced international competitiveness, and large current account deficits, 
all of which can generate pressures to devalue and make nervous money managers 
even more skittish. 
If private capital inflows are large and if significant portions of them come in the form 
of short-term loans or speculative portfolio investments, then the potential for 
destabilization capital flight can arise irrespective of the receiving nation's monetary 
regime. A currency board's fixed exchange rate is very unlikely to be creditable if it is 
perceived to be overvalued vis-a-vis the reserve currency either because it was set 
that way initially or subsequently became overvalued as a result of an inflation­
induced real appreciation. 
4.1 ) Responsible Policies 
The issue here is whether a country with a currency board system is, by virtue of 
having that system, less vulnerable to destabilizing international capital flows that one 
operating a more conventional central banks with fiduciary currency. On that point, 
the emerging evidence from Estonia and Argentina, together with that of countries 
such as Hong Kong where currency boards have prevailing for many years, is very 
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positive though not conclusive. It indicates that a country with a currency board is 
indeed more likely to be resilient to the destabilizing forces operating in today's 
integrated global currency markets. By encouraging more transparent and disciplined 
fiscal and monetary management, a currency board makes it more likely that the 
supporting cast of other policies and institutions will also be in place. 
Most important of all, a nation's replacement of its central bank with a currency board 
should symbolize that nation's seriously enhanced commitment to maintaining a 
sound currency and a stable exchange rate. Such credibility in the eyes of domestic 
and foreign investors is the greatest asset of a currency board. 
